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A FOUNDATION OF GRANITE OR 
SAND?  THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND UNITED 
STATES BILATERAL IMMUNITY 
AGREEMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
cholars of international law heralded the signing of the 
July 1998 Rome Statute, establishing the International 
Criminal Court,1 as long overdue, auspicious, controversial, or 
simply wrong.2  Nowhere in international law has a debate 
raged so fiercely over the legitimacy of a court, the evolution of 
the controlling law and the need for global cooperation as it has 
in the field of international criminal law.3  For many organiza-
tions and political bodies, many of which had labored indefati-
gably to salvage and promote human rights, the establishment 
of the Court stood as the physical embodiment of their efforts.4  
After decades of flagrant human rights violations coupled with 
  
 1. Hereinafter “ICC.” 
 2. Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and its Implication for 
Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215 (2002); 
International Criminal Court, Historical Introduction, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/php/show/php?id=history (last visited Nov. 14, 2003); Lawyers Commit-
tee For Human Rights, The International Criminal Court, at http://www. 
lchr.org/international_justice/icc/icc.htm (last visited on Nov. 14, 2003). 
 3. See International Criminal Court, Historical Introduction, supra note 
2. 
 4. Upon the ratification of the Rome Statute, Amnesty International pub-
lished a favorable commendation of the ICC and its goal of eradicating unac-
countable perpetrators of human rights violations.  “This is a very important 
moment in the struggle for international justice, because it means that people 
suspected of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide – 
no matter what their rank – may be tried by the court.”  Amnesty Interna-
tional further praised the mission and the authority of the court when it 
wrote, “A message is being sent around the world that people planning the 
worst crimes and human rights violations can no longer do so in the knowl-
edge that they won’t be held accountable.”  Press Release, Amnesty Interna-
tional, The International Criminal Court – a Historic Development in the Fight 
for Justice (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.amnesty.org.  
S 
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impunity,5 a concerted initiative for an international criminal 
court was launched in the General Assembly in 1991.6  But 
breathing life into the Court proved to be a Herculean task for 
the international community, resulting in a half-decade strug-
gle to determine (1) which crimes would fall under the jurisdic-
tion of the Court; (2) what structure and rules would be imple-
mented for its effective operation; and (3) from what source 
would the Court derive its jurisdiction – from state consent,7 
territoriality8 or universal jurisdiction?9 
Under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s jurisdiction 
originates from state consent,10 which manifests itself through 
either territorial or nationality jurisdiction.11  Alternatively, the 
ICC’s ultimate and most compelling source of authority may 
rest, however, in the philosophical natural laws underpinning 
the relationship between the international community’s rights 
  
 5. On the eve of its one year anniversary, the ICC stated, “In the past 
century, millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimagin-
able atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”  Press Kit, In-
ternational Criminal Court, First Anniversary of the Court (Jul. 1, 2003), 
available at http:www.icc-cpi.int/php/index.php. 
 6. Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 2002 ARMY LAW 1, 4 (2002). 
 7. For the purposes of this article, the word “state” means “country,” 
which is the customary vernacular of international law scholarship and prac-
tice. 
 8. Infra note 34. 
 9. Infra note 37. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 
art. 12 - 13 (1998) (United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998), re-
printed in, 37 I.L.M. 998 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 10. “Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction: A State which becomes a 
Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect 
to the crimes referred to in article 5.” Id. art. 12 (1). 
 11.  
[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the follow-
ing States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction 
of the court in accordance with paragraph 3: The State on the terri-
tory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was 
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of 
that vessel or aircraft; The State of which the person accused of the 
crime is a national.  
Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b). 
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and the correlative duties vested in the states.12  Where such a 
relationship exists, the states are under an obligation to uphold 
and defend not only their citizens’ rights but also the rights of 
the international community at large.13  This obligation springs 
from a complex relationship between international crimes, jus 
cogens and obligations erga omnes that has developed in cus-
tomary international law.14  Where that relationship imposes an 
affirmative duty on a state to adjudicate, convict and punish 
violators of international human rights, a state cannot shirk 
that duty.15 
This complex relationship between the international commu-
nities’ right to prosecution and the states’ duties to comply is 
not sufficiently protected, however, by consent or territorial-
based jurisdiction.  Instead, universal jurisdiction provides the 
strongest basis underpinning the ICC’s authority, allowing for a 
more effective and formidable court.16  Under the Rome Stat-
utes’ principle of complimentarity,17 the authority of the ICC is 
triggered when a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its duties 
to the international community, which demand that the state 
adjudicate international criminal offenses subject to universal 
  
 12. For the legal model on correlative rights and duties in a contract form, 
see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).  Infra note 86. 
 13. NINA H.B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERN-
ATIONAL CRIMES 217 (2000). 
 14. See Marjorie Cohn, How U.S. Opposition to International Court Jeop-
ardizes U.S. Troops, Sep. 10, 2003, at http://cnn.com (last visited Sep. 15, 
2003) [hereinafter How U.S. Opposition]. 
 15. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 
30-31. 
 16. Kofi Annan, in a message to the United Nations, asserted that “[o]nly a 
permanent court with universal jurisdiction can finally lay to rest the charge 
that the international community is being selective or applying double stan-
dards in deciding which crimes to investigate and punish.”  Kofi Annan, Mes-
sage of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY xiii (Mauro 
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001). 
 17. “[T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: The 
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over 
it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investiga-
tion or prosecution; The case has been investigated by a State which has ju-
risdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person con-
cerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute.” Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 17(1)(a)-(b). 
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jurisdiction.18  Essentially, this means that the state’s duty is 
then discharged to the ICC, under the jus cogens and obliga-
tions erga omnes doctrines of customary international law.19  
Any treaty or agreement violating or impeding that discharge of 
duty violates customary international law.20 
As of May 2004, ninety-four states had ratified the Rome 
Statute.21  The United States is not one of these countries, and 
has been vociferous in its opposition, expressing strong reserva-
tions over the legitimacy of the ICC and its jurisdiction over 
United States citizens.22  Less than five years after the Rome 
Statute authorized the ICC’s creation, the United States 
launched an unprecedented campaign to secure bilateral im-
munity agreements.23  The agreements explicitly exempt United 
  
 18. Id. art. 17(1)(a)-(b). 
 19. On the discharge of duty to the ICC, Amnesty International wrote that 
the states that ratified the Rome Statute “have accepted the primary obliga-
tion to investigate and prosecute people accused of the crimes and when they 
are unable or unwilling to do so the International Criminal Court may bring 
them to justice.”  Press Release, Amnesty International, The International 
Criminal Court, supra note 4. 
 20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), May 23, 1969, art. 
53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 21. International Criminal Court, States Parties, available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
 22. See The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen 
and Officials From the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 1-2 (2000) (statement of Sen. Jesse 
Helms, Chairman, Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations); Id. at 4-5 (statement 
of Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, Former Sec. of Def.); see also Human Rights 
Watch, ‘New Justice’ vs. Impunity: The International Criminal Court, Jun. 18, 
2003, at http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2003/icc061803.htm; see generally, 
Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International 
Criminal Court: Legal Analysis of Impunity Agreements, at http://www.hrw. 
org/campaigns/icc/docs/art98analysis.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2004). 
 23. The United States has engaged in a 
widespread campaign to undermine and marginalize the ICC to pre-
vent it from becoming an effective instrument of justice. … The bilat-
eral agreements sought by Washington would require states to send 
an American national requested by the ICC back to the U.S. instead 
of surrendering him/her to the ICC.  Importantly, Washington’s 
agreement would remove the ICC’s oversight function, which is the 
fundamental principle underpinning the Rome Statute and is critical 
to close the door on impunity. 
Human Rights Watch, Bilateral Immunity Agreements, Jun. 20, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org.  
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States citizens from the ICC’s reach.24  The United States’ ef-
forts to obtain immunity agreements have invigorated the de-
bate over the ICC’s legitimacy and underline the importance of 
the court’s jurisdictional basis.25 
Part I of this note defines and identifies international crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction and within the scope of the In-
ternational Criminal Court.  Part II discusses a state’s duty un-
der recognized doctrines of international law to punish perpe-
trators of those international crimes and the correlative right 
held by the international community to expect and demand ad-
judication.  Part III suggests that if a state is unable or unwill-
ing to prosecute those crimes, the state must discharge that 
duty to the ICC.  Part IV asserts that the United States’ bilat-
eral immunity agreements restricting the authority of the ICC 
contravene the United States’ duty to the international commu-
nity and hence are illegal under jus cogens. 
In April of 1999, less than a year after the signing of the 
Rome Statute and the birth of the ICC, a human rights crisis of 
mass proportions raged in Kosovo.26  Academics, politicians, dip-
lomats, and the media all grappled with the following issues: (1) 
humanitarian intervention; (2) genocide and other international 
crimes of that nature; (3) a state’s privilege or obligation to in-
tervene, prevent, or punish such crimes; and, (4) where to fit 
the ICC into the landscape of international criminal law.27  One 
commentator, writing on the unheeded threats made by the 
Clinton administration to Slobodan Milosevic to impose war-
crime prosecutions, concluded, “These threats have had no visi-
  
  The list of countries that have signed Bilateral Immunity Agreements 
with the United States continues to grow.  The list of states that have suc-
cumbed to the United States’ pressures to sign includes Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, East Timor, El Salvador, Georgia, Honduras, 
Romania, India, Israel, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and 
Tajikistan.  Many of these countries have reciprocal agreements with the 
United States that grant their citizens immunity from the ICC when on 
United States territory.  Id. at 7-13. 
 24. See Cohn, How U.S. Opposition, supra note 14. 
 25. Id.; see also John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
167 (2001). 
 26. See John R. Bolton, Clinton Meets “International Law” in Kosovo, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 5, 1999, at A23. 
 27. Id. 
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ble effect, and thus provide yet another compelling piece of evi-
dence why the new International Criminal Court – created in 
nearby Rome just this last summer – rests on a foundation of 
sand.”28   
By firmly establishing that the ICC’s jurisdiction is implicitly 
derived from universal jurisdiction, regardless of consent, na-
tionality, or territorial jurisdiction, the ICC’s foundation would 
be solid, as the protection the ICC affords to the relationship 
between rights and duties could not be eroded by bilateral im-
munity agreements or any other attempts to limit its scope and 
reach. 
I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES SUBJECT TO UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
A. The Birth of International Crimes 
Before World War II and the Nuremburg trials, very few 
crimes enjoyed the status of “international crimes.”  While two 
crimes, piracy29 and slavery30, had gained general consensus as 
subject to universal jurisdiction, it was not without considerable 
debate.31  In the early twentieth century not all scholars were 
persuaded that universal jurisdiction applied.  As a result, a 
debate raged in the scholarly rhetoric as to what form of juris-
diction was best applied to these crimes committed on the high 
seas and across international borders.32   
  
 28. Id. 
 29. “A pirate is defined as one who, without legal authority from any State, 
attacks a ship with intention to appropriate what belongs to it.”  In re Piracy 
Jure Gentium (1934) AC 586, 594-95 (internal quotes omitted). 
 30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 404 (1980). 
 31. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 (4th ed. 1997). 
 32. Subscribing to the universal jurisdiction paradigm, Shaw wrote: 
Universal jurisdiction over piracy has been accepted under interna-
tional law for many centuries and constitutes a long-established prin-
ciple of the world community.  All states may both arrest and punish 
pirates, provided of course that they have been apprehended on the 
high seas or within the territory of the state concerned.  The punish-
ment of the offenders takes place whatever their nationality and 
wherever they happen to carry out their criminal activities.              
Id. 
File: Ettari Macro 1123.doc Created on: 11/23/2004 2:23 PM Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:26 PM 
2004] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 211 
Some international legal scholars clung tenaciously to their 
preference for adjudication of criminal acts in domestic courts 
as opposed to international forums.33  The twentieth-century 
scholar Georg Schwarzenberger, subscribing to the “state-
sovereignty” or “territorial”34 international legal theory, con-
cluded in 1950 that “international criminal law in any true 
sense does not exist.”35  “Territorial” scholars, such as Schwar-
zenberger, concluded that the crime of piracy was adjudicable 
only in domestic courts.36   On the other hand, “naturalist” 
scholars,37  including scholars who prescribe to universal juris-
  
 33. As late as the 1950s, seasoned international law scholars debated over 
whether criminal acts could ever come under the auspices of international 
jurisdiction.  See John F. Murphy, International Crimes, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 362 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997), citing 
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 263, 295 (1950). 
 34. The territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction is that “courts of the 
place where the crime is committed may exercise jurisdiction.”  IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (5th ed. 1998).  Brownlie dis-
cuses the practical advantages of this theory of international criminal juris-
diction, including amongst them “a convenience of the forum and the pre-
sumed involvement of the interests of the state where the crime is commit-
ted.”  Id.  Shaw writes, in further support of the territorial principle, “That a 
country should be able to prosecute for offenses committed upon its soil is a 
logical manifestation of a world order of independent states and is entirely 
reasonable since the authorities of a state are responsible for the conduct of 
law and the maintenance of good order within that state.”  SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 458-59. 
 35. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 362.  Schwarzenber-
ger and others of his school of thought held solidly to the opinion that “an 
international criminal law that is meant to be applied to the world powers is a 
contradiction in terms.  It presupposes an international authority which is 
superior to these states.”  Id. 
 36. Schwarzenberger held that all crimes were of a nature most effectively 
handled in domestic courts:  
The rules of international law both on piracy jure gentium and war 
crimes constitute prescription to States to suppress piracy within 
their own jurisdiction and to exercise proper control over their own 
armed forces, and an authorization to other States to assume an ex-
traordinary criminal jurisdiction under their own municipal law in 
the case of piracy jure gentium and of war crimes committed prior to 
capture by the enemy.   
Id. 
 37. Two theories of international jurisdiction seem to fit nicely under the 
naturalist theory – that of the “universality” principle, which “justifies the 
repression of some types of crime as a matter of international public policy,” 
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diction, believed piracy was in the domain of the international 
community, subject to global jurisdiction because of its univer-
sally detrimental effects.38  Pirates traversing international wa-
ters often brandished the flag of their country of origin; yet they 
did not sail under the authority of that or any country.39  Fur-
ther, piracy was more palatably a crime subject to universal 
jurisdiction because (1) the crime occurred in international wa-
ters or on the “high seas”; (2) the pirate showed allegiance to no 
country (only to himself); and (3) consequently, the pirate had 
abandoned the protection or safeguards of his proclaimed state 
of affiliation.40 
Slavery, also characterized by perpetration on the high seas 
and transnational, borderless activities, shared an early birth 
as an established international crime.41  The preponderance of 
scholars and practitioners of international law now readily ac-
knowledge that states have a right to exert universal jurisdic-
  
and the more general “crimes under international law,” which expands the 
domain of the universality principle to incorporate crimes that “breach inter-
national law.”  Universality when taken to this broader expanse allows that 
some crimes “may be punished by any state which obtains custody of persons 
suspected of responsibility.”  BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 307-08. 
 38. The United Nations and scholars subscribing to universality ideologies 
arrived at a different view than the “territorial” scholars, advancing in the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas that “the view of ‘piracy’ as a crime 
against international law seek[s] only a tribunal with jurisdiction to apply 
that law and punish the criminal.”  Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 
33, at 363, citing A. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 319-37 (1988). 
 39. In Re Piracy Jure Gentium, the Privy Council called the pirate “a sea 
brigand.  He has no right to any flag and is justiciable by all.” In re Piracy 
Jure Gentium (1934) AC 586, 594-95. 
 40. The Privy Council justified universal jurisdiction over the crime of 
piracy by distinguishing crimes committed on “terra firma” [firm land] as 
falling under the domain of the “municipal law of each country” from crimes 
committed on the “high seas,” which were “justiciable by any State anywhere.”  
Id. at 589.  The Privy Council also held that the pirate, by committing his acts 
of piracy, “placed himself beyond the protection of any State.  He is no longer 
a national, but “hostis humani generis.”  Id. 
 41. The 1815 Declaration of the Congress of Vienna “equated traffic in 
slavery to piracy.”  Since that time, slavery has been subjected to the same 
“universal condemnation that existed with respect to piracy.”  M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives 
and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 112-13 (2001), citing M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR 
PENAL PROVISIONS 637-734 (1997). 
File: Ettari Macro 1123.doc Created on: 11/23/2004 2:23 PM Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:26 PM 
2004] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 213 
tion over piracy and slavery, the first acts to come under the 
heading of “international crimes.”42 
B. Nuremburg and Beyond 
The question of whether criminal acts could transcend the 
traditional domestic-modeled jurisdictions and demand a more 
expansive accountability to an international legal body was pre-
sented to the international community with an unprecedented 
urgency in the aftermath of World War II.43  This period, 
marked by an unparalleled human rights crisis, initiated a de-
bate and ultimately an affirmation that some crimes reach such 
proportion and level of atrocity as to demand accountability to 
humanity at large.44  At Nuremberg, the Military Tribunal “pro-
claimed the existence of two ‘new’ crimes under international 
law – crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.”45  
  
 42. See SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 470; Bassiouni, Uni-
versal Jurisdiction, supra note 41, at 112-13. 
 43. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 364; SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 471. 
 44. In the aftermath of World War II, the widespread effect and heinous 
nature of the war crimes committed under the Nazi regime caused outrage in 
the international community and it seemed the natural progression of inter-
national law to try the perpetrators of these atrocious acts.  Yet this was not 
the first time war crimes had been addressed in the international arena.  In 
1927, in the wake of World War I, French Extradition Law provided that “acts 
committed in the course of a civil war would not be protected as political of-
fences if they were acts of odious barbarism and vandalism prohibited by the 
laws of war.”  I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (1971) 
(internal quotes omitted).  Therefore, the trials at Nuremberg were consistent 
with a growing global effort towards eradicating war crimes and holding those 
responsible for their instigation liable.  Id. at 185-87.  
 45. “Crimes against humanity clearly cover genocide and related activi-
ties.”  SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 472.   
The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provided 
that  
[C]rimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and 
are prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed 
conflict, international or internal in character and that crimes 
against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, 
such as willful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a wide-
spread or systematic attack against any civilian population on na-
tional, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. 
Id., citing Security Council Resolution 827 (1993).   
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This proclamation advanced a growing list of international 
crimes and evidenced an emergent awareness of the necessary 
international accountability required to squelch crimes commit-
ted against humanity as a whole.46  All the individuals involved 
in prosecuting at the Nuremburg trials recognized the global 
responsibility to vindicate the crimes that had occurred under 
Hitler and his Nazi regime.47 At Nuremburg, a foundation was 
laid down for future international remedies for international 
crimes.48 
Hence, in the immediate years following World War II, crimes 
such as “genocide,”49 “ethnic cleansing”50 and “war crimes”51 re-
  
  The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda defines crimes 
against humanity as crimes committed “as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds,” encompassing “murder, extermination, enslavement, de-
portation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and 
religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.”  Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, Security Council Resolution 955 (1994). 
 46. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 364, citing the Judg-
ment of the International Military Tribunal, 6 FRD 69, 107 (1946).  Murphy 
contends that the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the 
General Assembly on December 9, 1948, both affirming the “new crimes,” 
support the proposition that punishment for crimes against peace and against 
humanity is “recognized broadly as international customary law.”  Id.; see also 
Peter Burns, An International Criminal Tribunal: The Difficult Union of 
Principle and Politics, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 127 
(Roger Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1994). 
 47. Justice Jackson, as Chief Prosecutor for the United States, said in his 
opening statement,  
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against 
the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. … That four 
great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the 
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to 
the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that 
Power has ever paid to Reason.  We must never forget that the record 
on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history 
will judge us tomorrow.   
Benjamin Ferencz, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Personal Account (2004), 
available at http:www.benferencz.org/feb20041.htm. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Genocide, as defined by the United Nations Security Council in Article 
2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, includes any of the 
following acts  
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ceived universal condemnation from the international commu-
nity.52  The development of customary international law defin-
ing these crimes and promoting their prosecution has led to 
global cooperation in creating ad hoc tribunals, such as the In-
  
[C]ommitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the 
group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group.  
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, supra note 45. 
 50. In its resolution creating an international tribunal for the prosecution 
of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
in Yugoslavia, the Security Council included in the list of reported crimes over 
which it had “grave alarm” “mass killings, massive, organized and systematic 
detention and rape of women, and the continuance of the practice of ethnic 
cleansings.”  S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); see also the Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on its Forty-Sixth Session, UN G.A.O.R., 49th Sess, Supp.No.10 UN 
Doc.A/49/10 (1994). 
 51. The four Geneva “Red Cross” Conventions of 1949 extended universal 
jurisdiction over “grave breaches” of crimes against humanity, which included 
“willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, unlawful deportation of pro-
tected persons and the taking of hostages.”  The list was later extended to 
include “attacking civilian populations.”  SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 31, at 471, citing G. I. D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS, 105 
(1958). 
 52. “War crimes and genocide are now widely accepted as being susceptible 
to universal jurisdiction.”  REBECCA WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (2002).  
In support of this rule of customary international law, Wallace points to two 
separate instances, the first, the Eichmann Case, in which Israel claimed 
jurisdiction on grounds that “a universal course (pertaining to the whole of 
mankind), [ ] vests the right to prosecute and punish crimes of this order in 
every state within the family of nations.”  Id. at 114; see also, Attorney-
General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961); Kenneth 
C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
785 (1988).  Randall notes that Israel’s assertion of jurisdiction over 
Eichmann was distinct from previous Nazi trials in that “the state of Israel 
did not exist when Eichmann committed his crimes.”  However, “the fact that 
Israel was not a state when Eichmann acted does not affect the legitimacy of 
Israel’s jurisdiction under the universality principle.”  Id., at 814. 
Second, Wallace finds support for universal jurisdiction over war crimes and 
genocide in the Charter of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, art. 6, “which 
referred to crimes against peace, violations of the laws and customs of war, 
and crimes against humanity and for which there was to be individual respon-
sibility… [T]he judgment[s] of the Tribunal are now accepted as international 
law.”  WALLACE, supra at 52. 
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ternational Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia,53 international courts, such as the War Crimes Tri-
bunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia,54 and forums such as the 
South African Human Rights Commission and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights,55 all sufficiently 
equipped with the legal tools and precedents to try the perpe-
trators of international crimes.  
The growing body of international documents that address 
war crimes and crimes against humanity strive to effectively 
and efficiently make those who perpetrate them accountable 
before any competent body, domestic or international, capable 
and willing.56  In 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide set guidelines for punish-
ing genocide.57  The Convention declared genocide punishable 
during times of war as well as “in the absence of international 
armed conflict” and classified genocide as a “crime under inter-
national law” subject to universal jurisdiction.58 
Almost thirty years later, in 1973, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly passed Resolution 3074, “Principles of Interna-
tional Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity,” which declared that “States shall co-
  
 53. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, at http:// 
www.ictr.org/default.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index. 
htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004). 
 54. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, at http://www.sc-sl.org/ (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2004); Special Tribunal for Cambodia, at http://www.global 
policy.org/intljustice/camindx.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004). 
 55. See South African Human Rights Commission, at http:// 
www.sahrc.org.za/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, at http://www.achpr.org/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/De 
faultE.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004). 
 56. See SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 472. 
Following World War II, many of the international documents and bilateral 
and multilateral treaties promulgated in an effort to apprehend and try those 
responsible for war crimes avoided the use of the word ‘extradition’ in an ef-
fort to “give States the widest latitude in resorting to measures of rendition.” 
SHEARER, supra note 44, at 186. 
 57. G.A. Res. 260A(III) of 9 Dec. 1948.  U.N. Treaty Series No. 78, at 279. 
 58. Nigel S. Rodley, The International Legal Consequences of Torture, Ex-
tra-Legal Execution, and Disappearance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS 177-78 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989). 
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operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral basis 
with a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, and shall take the domestic and interna-
tional measures necessary for that purpose.”59  Although the 
resolution specified that “every State has the right to try its 
own nationals for war crimes or crimes against humanity” and 
asserted that “persons against whom there is evidence that they 
have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity shall 
be subject to trial and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a gen-
eral rule in the countries in which they committed those 
crimes,” the resolution does not preclude or exclude other States 
from apprehending and prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes 
and in fact calls for State cooperation.60 
After Nuremberg, the international community gradually 
amassed a substantial list of international crimes, evidenced 
through treaties, General Assembly and Security Council Reso-
lutions, and case law under which states had the privilege to 
adjudicate criminals under the doctrine of universal jurisdic-
tion, regardless of whether the crimes had been perpetrated 
within their domestic borders or by their nationals.61  Interna-
tional crimes of torture, slavery and/or deportation or forcible 
transfer of population, whether or not they were on a “massive” 
scale or “systematically” carried out, were firmly rooted in that 
doctrine.62  Torture, defined as any act by which “severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining… information or confession, punishing 
him for an act he has committed or is suspected… or intimidat-
  
 59. Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Ex-
tradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity.  G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. 
No. 30, at 78 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). 
 60. Id. ¶ 2-3, 5.  
Scholars have embraced this broader allowance of universal jurisdiction as 
well.  “The resolution reaffirms that war crimes and crimes against humanity 
are subject to universal jurisdiction, calls upon states to assist each other in 
‘detecting, arresting, and bringing to trial persons suspected of having com-
mitted such crimes and, if they are found guilty, in punishing them.’”  Mur-
phy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 375. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 366. 
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ing him or other persons,”63 is one of the oldest practiced and 
most widely condemned crimes under international law.64  Thus, 
all States clearly have a privilege (more commonly labeled a 
right in scholarly vernacular) either to extradite an alleged tor-
turer or try him where he is found on the basis of universality of 
jurisdiction.65 
Even the jurisprudence of the United States condemns tor-
ture and acknowledges universal jurisdiction over the torturer, 
no matter where the crime was committed, analogizing the tor-
turer to “the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani 
generis, an enemy of mankind.”66  In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
“deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority 
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of 
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.  
Thus, whenever an alleged torture is found and served with 
process by an alien within our borders [there is] federal juris-
diction.”67 
  
 63. G.A. Res. 3452, 30th Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 34 at 91, U.N. Doc. 
A/1034 (1975).  Torture as defined in the “Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture” does “not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions to the extent con-
sistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.”  
Id. 
 64. See Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 370-71. See also 
“Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”  
G.A. Res. 57/200, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 77th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/57/200 (2003); “Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”  G.A. 
Res. 57/199, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/199 (2003). 
 65. See Rodley, supra note 58, at 182-83. 
 66. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 67. Id. at 878. 
The Filartiga family, citizens of Paraguay, brought this action in the Eastern 
District of New York against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, a citizen of Para-
guay and the former Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay.  The 
Filartigas claimed that their son had been tortured and killed by Pena as 
retaliation for the father’s political activities and beliefs and had autopsies 
demonstrating that the seventeen-year-old boy’s death “was the result of pro-
fessional methods of torture.”  When the Filartigas brought an initial action 
against Pena in Paraguay their attorney was also tortured and subsequently 
disbarred on trumped-up charges.  At the time of this suit in the United 
States, the suit in Paraguay had been pending over four years.  The Second 
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In addition to the well established international crimes sub-
ject to universal jurisdiction that allow states to extradite or try 
perpetrators, an additional body of crimes is gradually gaining 
a foothold in the international community and may eventually 
afford states the same privilege to try and punish the perpetra-
tor where found.68  Examples of international activities that 
have long since plagued the global community, and are rapidly 
evolving into “international crimes” that in the near future may 
be subject to adjudication under the doctrine of universal juris-
diction, include drug trafficking69 and international terrorism.70 
  
Circuit based its jurisdiction over Pena on the practices and obligations of the 
international community.  
In the twentieth century the international community has come to 
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic 
human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture… 
[C]ivilized nations have banded together to prescribe acceptable 
norms of international behavior.  From the ashes of the Second World 
War arose the United Nations Organization, amid hopes that an era 
of peace and cooperation had at last begun. 
Id, at 878-79, 890. 
 68. From the “Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” in 1960 to the bilat-
eral and multilateral treaties in the following decades, which expanded extra-
ditable offenses to include violations of narcotics laws, there is an ever-
increasing movement towards the addition of trafficking in narcotic drugs to 
the ranks of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.  See CHRISTOPHER L. 
BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN LIBERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ITS NATURE, 
ROLE, AND IMPACT IN MATTERS OF TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, WAR, AND 
EXTRADITION 140, 214 (1992), citing the 1986 Supplementary Extradition 
Treaty Between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany; cit-
ing the United States–French Supplementary Treaty taken from the United 
States Draft Extradition Convention; see also Molly McConville, A Global War 
on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the Prosecution of Drug 
Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 75 
(2000) (advancing the need for an international court and universal jurisdic-
tion over drug traffickers); REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 5 (1994) (One of the origi-
nal jurisdiction proposals for the International Criminal Court was that it 
have limited jurisdiction over international drug trafficking only). 
 69. See Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 369-70, citing 
1936 Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 198 
LNTS 229 (Murphy notes that this Convention called for “drug traffickers to 
be punished by all governments, regardless of the criminal’s nationality or the 
place where the crime was committed.”); also citing Convention Against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 
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82/15/Corr. 1 & Corr.2, adopted by consensus Dec. 20, 1988, reprinted in 28 
ILM 493 (1989). 
  Drug Trafficking’s escalation into the echelons of international crimes 
is increasingly due to the fact that the crime is often transnational, includes 
or breeds other forms of crime, and demonstrates a serious threat to “interna-
tional peace and security.”  See generally, McConville, A Global War on Drugs, 
supra note 68, at 75. 
 70. The General Assembly Resolution on “Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism” reiterated the World 
Conference on Human Rights of June 1993 by stating that  
[A]cts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and mani-
festations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integ-
rity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted 
Governments, and….the international community should take the 
necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terror-
ism. 
G.A. Res. 57/219, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/219 (2003).  
  “Whether the crimes covered by the anti-terrorist conventions may be 
classified as “international crimes” is debatable.  At the very least, they estab-
lish a legal framework for states parties to cooperate toward punishment of 
the perpetrators of these crimes.”  Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 
33, at 368.  See also Dinah L. Shelton, The Relationship of International Hu-
man Rights Law and Humanitarian Law to the Political Offense Exception to 
Extradition, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 149-50 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. 
eds., 1989).  As early as the 1970s, the European community recognized the 
need for global cooperation in apprehending and prosecuting terrorists.  See 
BLAKESLEY, supra note 68, at 140-42, citing The European Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, E.T.S. No. 90, 
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272-76 (1976). 
  States which were a party to the European Convention on the Suppres-
sion of Terrorism “obtaining custody of a person who has allegedly engaged in 
that specified violent conduct [are] obligated to prosecute or extradite that 
person.”  European Convention, supra at art. 7. 
  Immediately following the terrorist attacks on New York City and 
Washington, D.C., the Security Council issued Resolution 1368, in which it 
called on all States “to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetra-
tors, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and [stressed] that 
those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring [sic] the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.”  S.C. Res. 
1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Year, 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001). 
  Under Resolution 1377, the Security Council stressed “continuing in-
ternational efforts to broaden the understanding among civilizations and to 
address regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including devel-
opment issues [in order to] contribute to international cooperation and col-
laboration, which themselves are necessary to sustain the broadest possible 
fight against international terrorism.”  The UN also called on all States to 
“become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions 
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C. Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court 
Considering the legal scholarship and development of inter-
national criminal law in the preceding century, the Rome Stat-
ute astutely placed the following three crimes squarely within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.71  All three were un-
arguably crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary in-
ternational law.72 
  Genocide was defined as 
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, 
as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflict-
ing on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.73 
Crimes against humanity were defined in exhaustive detail.74  
A crime against humanity is any murder, extermination,75 en-
slavement,76 deportation or forcible transfer of population,77 im-
  
and protocols relating to terrorism.”  S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Year, 
4413th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001).  See also S.C. Res. 1465, U.N. 
SCOR, 58th Year, 4706th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1465 (2003); S.C. Res. 
1456, U.N. SCOR, 58th Year, 4688th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003); 
S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. SCOR, 58th Year, 4686th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1455 (2003); S.C. Res. 1452, U.N. SCOR, 57th Year, 4678th mtg. at 1, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (2002); S.C. Res. 1450, U.N. SCOR, 57th Year, 4667th 
mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1450 (2002); S.C. Res. 1440, U.N. SCOR, 57th 
Year, 4632nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1440 (2002). 
 71. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 5(1). 
 72. See Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 364. 
 73. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 6(a)-(e). 
 74. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 7. 
 75. Extermination “includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, 
inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring 
about the destruction of part of a population.”  Id. at art. 7(2)(b). 
 76. Enslavement was defined as “the exercise of any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of 
such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and 
children.”  Id. at art. 7(2)(c). 
 77. Deportation or forcible transfer of population is defined as “forced dis-
placement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from 
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prisonment, torture,78 rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitu-
tion, enforced disappearance of persons79 or “other inhumane 
acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” com-
mitted as part of “a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”80  
Sex crimes were also listed as crimes against humanity, includ-
ing “forced pregnancy,81 enforced sterilization, or any other form 
of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”82 
War crimes were also defined in the statute in great and 
painstaking detail.  First, war crimes are described as “grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949” [includ-
ing but not limited to] willful killing; torture or inhumane 
treatment, and willfully causing great suffering, or serious in-
jury to body or health.83  Also included in the definition of war 
crimes were “other serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in international armed conflict” such as “intention-
ally directing attacks against the civilian population…or 
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostili-
ties.”84  The Statute also defined certain acts as war crimes, re-
gardless of the conflict’s character—international or domestic.85 
  
the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under 
international law.”  Id. at art. 7(2)(d). 
 78. Torture is defined as “intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control 
of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to, law sanctions.”  Id. at art. 7(2)(e). 
 79. Enforced disappearance of persons is defined as “the arrest, detention 
or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence 
of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge 
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts 
of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of 
the law for a prolonged period of time.”  Id. at art. 7(2)(i). 
 80. Id. at art. 7(1). 
 81. Forced pregnancy is defined as “the unlawful confinement of a woman 
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of 
any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.  
This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws 
relating to pregnancy.”  Id. at art. 7(2)(f). 
 82. Id. at art. 7(1)(g). 
 83. Id. at art. 8(2)(a). 
 84. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(i). 
 85. Id. at art. 8(2)(c). 
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II. STATE DUTY TO ADJUDICATE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERPLAY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES  
In 1913, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld introduced a legal para-
digm regarding rights and duties that established a correlative 
relationship between the holder of a right and the holder of a 
duty.86  Groundbreaking and controversial,87 Hohfeld’s assertion 
that for every legal right there was a correlative duty, created a 
context in which legal jurists could determine whether a party 
had a distinct right for which it was owed a duty or conversely a 
privilege for which there was no correlative right.88  A “right” 
was a claim, enforceable by state power, “that others act in a 
certain manner in relation to the right-holder.”89  According to 
Hohfeld, a right was “much more complex than a mere legal 
advantage.”90  The weaker claim of privilege, often confused as a 
right, entailed “permission to act in a certain manner without 
being liable for damages to others and without others being able 
to summon state power to prevent those acts.”91  Hohfeld was 
primarily concerned with clarifying “the fundamental difference 
  
 86. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, supra note 12, at 30. 
 87. According to Joseph William Singer, Hohfeld’s paradigm evoked a 
great deal of contention among legal scholars and practitioners, some of whom 
believed it “path breaking” or a “brilliant innovation” and others who thought 
it “naïve.”  Other scholars debated over whether Hohfeld’s model was too 
broad (the eight terms – rights, privileges, powers, immunities, no-rights, 
duties, disabilities and liabilities – should be trimmed) or too narrow (the 
terms must be increased to create a more usable paradigm, taking into con-
sideration other kinds of legal relationships).  Joseph William Singer, The 
Legal Rights Debate In Analytical Jurisprudence From Bentham to Hohfeld, 
1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 978, 989-90, 992 (1982). 
 88. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 30-
31. 
 89. Singer, Legal Rights Debate, supra note 87, at 986. 
In their review of Richard Primus’ book THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS, 
Jack N. Rakove and Elizabeth Beaumont introduce three reasons for exerting 
rights in conjunction with Hohfeld’s definition.  First, a right may be asserted 
to “claim general authority for specific propositions,” secondly, “to attempt to 
entrench politically precarious practices,” and lastly “to declare particular 
practices or propositions to be of special importance.”  Jack N. Rakove & 
Elizabeth Beaumont, Rights Talk in the Past Tense, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1865, 
1873 (2000) (book review). 
 90. Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, Human Duties, Obliga-
tions, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, n.126 (2001). 
 91. Singer, Legal Rights Debate, supra note 87, at 986. 
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between legal liberties ([with corresponding] privileges) and 
legal rights [with corresponding duties].”92 
Although Hohfeld did not originally discuss his paradigm in 
the framework of human rights, eventually his model was ap-
plied to the determination of what human rights or “moral 
rights” were true rights or “legal claims” and which were mere 
privileges or “liberties.”93  Genuine rights cannot be “created” or 
“bestowed” by a State, as can liberties or privileges.94  Rather, 
States in a Hohfeldian context may only choose to ignore or rec-
ognize human rights, and despite an attempt to ignore or dis-
avow those rights, the State’s correlative duty to the right re-
mains.95  Human rights law represents a distinct area of the law 
in which legal and moral rights and duties intersect and over-
  
 92. Singer holds that Hohfeld’s motivation for creating this paradigm was 
to clear up a centuries-long confusion between rights and privileges.  Hohfeld 
“criticized his predecessors for not understanding the ‘fundamental and im-
portant difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege or liberty.”  
Hohfeld’s paradigm clearly established that difference, employing “correla-
tives [to] express a single legal relation from the point of view of two parties.”  
Id. at 987.  Hohfeld sought to end the use of the word “right” when the legal 
jurist or scholar more precisely intended to “invoke any of the other entitle-
ments.”  Rakove & Beaumont, Rights Talk, supra note 89, at 1873. 
 93. James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental 
Extension of Rights Is Not a Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 51-52 
(2001). 
 94. Id. at 45-46. 
 95. Donovan discussed human rights in this context as “rights beyond the 
reach of the state because it is not within the state’s power to deprive us of our 
humanity other than, perhaps, to kill us.  The contrast is presumably between 
inalienable human rights and merely civil rights that the state can control, 
bestow and withdraw.”  He reinforced that true human rights are “inalien-
able.”  Id. 
  Whether or not certain human rights are inherently born of “natural 
law” or are identified by another theoretical philosophy, as societies develop 
and change “[States’] understanding and grants of rights to their members 
must also change and develop.”  Donovan’s concept of emerging human rights 
coexists with a practice in which “rights will necessarily be recognized and 
enforced piecemeal.  The category of ‘human rights’ is therefore a cluster right 
that has accreted over time as new rights have been identified and new cate-
gories of persons encompassed.”  Id. at 56. 
  For a discussion on human rights springing from natural law, see gen-
erally Theordore S. Orlin & Martin Scheinin, Introduction to THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETIVE 
APPROACH 22 (Theordore S. Orlin et al. eds.) (2000). 
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lap, creating “a range of express, implied, correlative, regional, 
and emergent human duties, obligations, and responsibilities.”96   
In addition to its duty to ensure that human rights are main-
tained within its domestic borders, a state also has a role in ap-
prehending and trying those who violate international criminal 
laws97 under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.98  A subject of 
ongoing debate is whether that role, under the Hohfeldian 
paradigm, is a mere privilege with no corresponding right or 
rather an outright obligation with a correlative right vested in 
the international community.99  A state’s privilege, often re-
  
 96. Saul wrote that “many legal duties are based on, or codify, pre-existing 
moral duties, although all moral duties are not necessarily legally enforceable 
ones.”  He defined a “duty” as a “task or action that a person is bound to per-
form for moral or legal reasons,” and an “obligation” as “a moral or legal re-
quirement.”  Despite an attempt to distinguish the two, Saul conceded “both 
duty and obligation are allied with the idea of coercion, in that they are bur-
dens imposed on, or required of, someone.”  Saul, In the Shadow of Human 
Rights, supra note 90, at 575, 580 (internal quotes omitted).  See also Dono-
van, Incremental Extension of Rights, supra note 93, at 52 (“Because some 
legal rights are obviously not moral rights, the relationship between the two is 
neither that of synonyms nor subsets, but instead constitutes a third relation-
ship: Legal rights and moral rights are independent but intersecting catego-
ries”). 
 97. International criminal law “assigns criminal responsibility for certain 
particularly serious violations of international law.”  Steven R. Ratner, The 
Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 237, 238 
(1998), citing STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG 
LEGACY 9 (1997). 
 98. “Universal jurisdiction may be exercised by a state without any juris-
dictional connection or link between the place of commission, the perpetrator’s 
nationality, the victim’s nationality, and the enforcing state.”  The rationale 
behind universal jurisdiction is to “enhance world order by ensuring account-
ability for the perpetration of certain crimes.”  Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdic-
tion for International Crimes, supra note 41, at 88-89. 
  Ratner proposes two main purposes for universal jurisdiction: a sym-
bolic one, “as a statement of international concern about the severity of the 
act” and as a practical one, “as a means of improving enforcement that gener-
ally presupposes universal jurisdiction and requires states to extradite or 
prosecute offenders.”  Ratner, Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 
supra note 97, at 253. 
 99. Ratner concludes that states do have a right under universal jurisdic-
tion to try international crimes but no obligation or duty to do so.  Addressing 
genocide in particular, he wrote, “[C]ustomary international law clearly rec-
ognizes the right (though not the duty) of a state to prosecute for genocide 
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ferred to as a right outside the Hohfeldian paradigm, to try for 
international crimes developed into a rule of customary interna-
tional law over the latter half of the twentieth century, despite 
criticism and opposition from some international law practitio-
ners.100   
When applying the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to 
Hohfeld’s categories of correlative rights and duties and corre-
sponding non-rights and privileges,101 a state’s right to try in-
ternational crimes clearly subject to universal jurisdiction is 
recognized under customary international law as an indisput-
able Hohfeldian privilege.102  Therefore, when a state finds the 
perpetrator, national or not, of a recognized international crime 
such as piracy, slavery, genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity on its soil, it has the privilege to try that in-
dividual regardless of the location of his crime.103  As a mere 
  
committed anywhere, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the 
victim.”  Id. at 254. 
 100. Critiquing reports published by Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, renowned international scholar M. Cherif Bassiouni cautioned, 
“Universal jurisdiction is not as well established in conventional and custom-
ary international law as its ardent proponents, including major human rights 
organizations, profess it to be.”  Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 
41, at 83, n.1.   
  Despite scholarly controversy, it is a fact that “many states have juris-
diction to try offenses that have taken place outside their territory.”  SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW supra note 31 at 453, 470.  Even Bassiouni concedes in 
his article that universal jurisdiction exists for certain international crimes, 
whether through jus cogens or customary international law, but should be 
utilized cautiously.  See generally, Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra 
note 41. 
 101. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913), supra note 12. 
 102. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 9, 
254 (1997). 
 103. For select evidence that these crimes are subject to universal jurisdic-
tion under customary international law see In re Piracy Jure Gentium (1934) 
AC 586, supra note 29 (piracy); Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 
41, at 88-89 (slavery); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 
2, Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), supra note 45 (genocide); REBECCA 
WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (2002), supra note 52 (genocide and war 
crimes); “Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, 
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes 
against Humanity.”  G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. 
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privilege, however, the international community has no correla-
tive right to demand that the state apprehend and try the in-
ternational criminal; rather, under Hohfeld’s paradigm, they 
have a non-right, which bestows no expectation that the indi-
vidual state has or will fulfill a duty or obligation to try.104   
Without establishing a duty invested in the states, the inter-
national community only has the ability to encourage the state 
to exert its privilege; it cannot enforce a right.105   Yet, as the list 
of international crimes continues to evolve,106 and new crimes 
such as drug trafficking and terrorism slowly begin gaining rec-
ognition as possible crimes subject to universal jurisdiction,107 
other crimes formerly justiciable as a state’s privilege may have 
metamorphosed into crimes for which a state has a duty to ad-
judicate.108 
  
No. 30, at 78 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); supra note 59 (crimes against hu-
manity). 
 104. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 30-
31. 
 105. For a brief discussion of the pressures international organizations 
place on states to exert authority under universal jurisdiction, see Bassiouni, 
Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 41, at 83, n.1.  
 106. The Restatement, in its discussion of the customary law of human 
rights, qualifies a short list of acts that violate those laws, which includes 
genocide, slavery, slave trade, and a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights.  In a comment, the writers of the 
Restatement qualify, “the list is not necessarily complete, and is not closed: 
human rights not listed in this section may have achieved the status of cus-
tomary law, and some rights might achieve that status in the future.”  If the 
rights continue to evolve, then clearly the privilege to try crimes that violate 
those rights would grow apace.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. a (1987). 
  The Reporters’ Notes also indicate that other rights may “already have 
become customary law and international law may develop to include addi-
tional rights.”  It is even noted that an argument has been advanced that 
“customary international law is already more comprehensive than here indi-
cated.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 Rep. n.1 (1987). 
 107. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 369-70, citing 1936 
Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 198 
LNTS 229, supra note 69; BLAKESLEY, supra note 68, at 140-41. 
 108. On the evolution of international crimes subject to universal jurisdic-
tion, see generally Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Ju-
risdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383 (2001).  “As the fundamental values and 
norms of the international system have evolved, so too has the number of 
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Among international legal scholars, there is an emerging con-
sensus that for particular international crimes a state’s privi-
lege to apprehend and try perpetrators has undoubtedly ripened 
into an affirmative duty or obligation.109  Utilizing Hohfeld’s 
paradigm, this maturation of a privilege into a duty stems from 
the developing relationship of the international community to 
the actual international crimes.110  If some international crimes 
transcend a non-right status and assume the label of right, then 
the correlative duty must be vested somewhere.111  The principle 
that those rights have correlative duties intrinsically vested in 
individual states has gained a great deal of weight, rooted in 
the international doctrines of jus cogens and obligations erga 
omnes.112 
In order to establish that states have an obligation to adjudi-
cate international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, it 
must first be established that certain rights are indeed held by 
the international community.113  Applying the Hohfeldian model, 
legal academic Ben Saul asserted, “In civil rights and human 
rights law, the most commonly recognized duties are correlative 
duties, referring to those duties that complement specific 
rights… [A] right is a legal advantage that entails a correspond-
  
crimes established by international law.  Some of these new international 
crimes have become subject to universal jurisdiction.” Id. at 384. 
 109. Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, supra note 90, at 585; Samuel 
K. Murumba, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and the Chal-
lenge of Global Markets: Themes and Variations, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 5 
(1999); Nigel S. Rodley, The International Legal Consequences of Torture, Ex-
tra-Legal Execution, and Disappearance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS 177 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989), supra note 58 (highlighting spe-
cific war crimes that, under the Geneva Convention, “oblige states parties to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of universality of 
jurisdiction”). 
 110. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 30-
31. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 
108, at 391-94. 
 113. ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 56-57 (1996).  In a discussion 
on the ILC-draft on State responsibility, de Hoogh discusses theories behind 
international crimes and corresponding state responsibilities and obligations, 
particularly regarding “safeguarding the human being… prohibiting slavery, 
genocide and apartheid.”  Id. at 56. 
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ing duty or disadvantage.”114  Major human rights treaties, the 
rhetoric of which spans the last two centuries and has gained 
increasing prominence in the last half century, support the be-
lief that “the primary responsibility for the protection of human 
rights falls upon State Parties.”115  The preamble to the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights reinforces that sentiment 
when stating that citizens of the world have “equal and inalien-
able rights,” which “should be protected by the rule of law.”116  
The Restatement on Foreign Relations addresses those rights 
promulgated in the Declaration and acknowledges that some 
rights enjoy a more conscientious protection.117  “All the rights 
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration and protected by the 
principal International Covenants are internationally recog-
nized human rights, but some rights are fundamental and in-
trinsic to human dignity.”118  Subsequently, States have the cor-
relative duty to uphold the “fundamental and intrinsic” rights 
that belong to the International Community as a whole.119  Un-
  
 114. Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, supra note 90, at 585.   
 115. Saul turned for support to human rights documents as old as the 
French Revolution’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
and more recently the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
1966 International Convent on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  It must 
be pointed out here, however, that many of the “rights” listed in early docu-
ments like the 1688 English Bill of Rights or the 1789 French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man are, under the Hohfeldian paradigm, “privileges” as op-
posed to “rights”.  Id. at 588, 610.   
 116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).  Although some of the “rights” 
listed would fall under “privileges or liberties” in the Hohfeldian model, tradi-
tional rights to which the State owed a correlative duty included the “right to 
life, liberty and security of person,” the right not to be held “in slavery or ser-
vitude,” and the right not to be “subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”  Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Id. at art. 3-5. 
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 cmt. m (1987). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Murumba, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and 
the Challenge of Global Markets, supra note 109, at 5 (“As originally conceived 
in the Universal Declaration, and in antecedent natural law theorizing, hu-
man rights were principally the claims of individuals against or upon the 
state or the society it represented.  In Hohfeldian terms, the state had the 
primary duties correlative to these rights” (internal quotes omitted)); see also 
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der the Declaration, “Everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating 
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by 
law.”120  Under the Hohfeldian model, the implication exists that 
the correlative duty to provide an effective remedy lies with the 
States.121 
In the late twentieth century, momentum increased for a 
mandatory requirement upon states to extradite for the com-
mission of all international crimes for which there is universal 
jurisdiction, even in the absence of an extradition treaty.122  
Such a requirement would consequently transform extradition 
for international crimes from a state privilege to a state duty.123  
Beyond the scope of universal jurisdiction, there are standard 
customs and general principles of international law involving 
extradition under treaties, which many states utilize to bring 
“international crimes” under their jurisdiction.124  Under the 
General Assembly’s 1990 Model Treaty on Extradition, the obli-
gation/duty is analogous to a contract, where the State required 
to extradite under the treaty owes a duty correlative to the 
right of the State demanding extradition.125  Furthermore, an 
argument can be made, implementing the human rights appli-
cation of Hohfeld, that states are under a moral obligation, aris-
ing under natural law, that exists whether or not extradition is 
concretely embedded in a treaty.126  While many international 
  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 
cmt. m (1987). 
 120. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 116, at art. 8. 
 121. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 30-
31. 
 122. Despite overwhelming scholarly support for universal jurisdiction, 
Rebecca Wallace unequivocally holds that there is no duty to extradite in the 
absence of treaties; however, she does note that the ILC’s Draft Code of 
Crimes, Art. 6 “[s]eeks to impose an obligation on state to extradite an indi-
vidual alleged to have committed crimes against humanity.”  WALLACE, supra 
note 52, at 119. 
 123. Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, supra note 90, at 580.  Here the 
word “duty” can be interchanged easily with the word “obligation.”  Both con-
note burdens “imposed on, or required on, someone.”   
 124. Model Treaty on Extradition.  G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR, 45th 
Sess., 68th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1990). 
 125. Id. 
 126. “While legal obligations may be the most familiar form of obligations, 
there are also obligations which are not specifically legal, such as those aris-
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crimes have come under universal jurisdiction as a rule of cus-
tomary international law, the United Nations and other inter-
national bodies began at the end of the 20th Century to push 
codification of universal jurisdiction over these crimes, particu-
larly through the Model Treaty on Extradition.127  In addition to 
affirming the human rights application to the correlative 
right/duty contract-model, the Model Treaty encourages states 
to update existing treaties, or enter into treaties that conform to 
“recent developments in international law,” which include the 
consideration and application of universal jurisdiction where 
appropriate.128 
Earlier treaties dealing with multilateral extradition set ba-
sic guidelines for extradition, establishing safeguards that are 
applicable when applied to international crimes subject to or 
exempt from universal jurisdiction.129  Under the 1957 European 
Convention on Extradition, an obligation to extradite under 
existing extradition treaties was upheld for cases where the 
conditions for extradition had been fulfilled, including “a mini-
mum degree of seriousness”130 and “double criminality.”131  How-
ever, where no treaty exists, if it were established that extradi-
tion and adjudication for certain international crimes were no 
longer privileges but rather duties, confronted States would be 
  
ing from some precept or any kind of duty.  Such obligations are inherent in 
the very nature of man and are often called moral law.”  SATYA DEVA BEDI, 
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 52 (1968). 
 127. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 124; see also Murphy, Interna-
tional Crimes, supra note 33, at 377. 
 128. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 124. 
Additionally, the Model Treaty seeks to assist States in extradition matters 
regarding criminal acts of a terrorist character, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances, and all other crimes that undermine respect for 
human dignity mindful of the “rights conferred upon every person involved in 
criminal proceedings.”  All of the listed acts are international crimes over 
which the debate rages as to whether they have risen to the level of crimes 
deserving universal jurisdiction.  Id. 
 129. Christine van den Wyngaert & Guy Stessens, Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters in the European Union, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE 302-04 (John Dugard & Christine van den Wyngaert eds., 
1996). 
 130. The offense must be punishable with a custodial sentence of at least a 
year.  Id. 
 131. The offense for which extradition is requested should be punishable 
under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state. Id. 
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obligated to comply with the requirements of universal jurisdic-
tion.132   
This duty to comply with the obligations of universal jurisdic-
tion arises under the extrinsically bound international concepts 
of obligations erga omnes133 and jus cogens.134  Obligations erga 
omnes “flow from a class of norms the performance of which is 
owed to the international community as a whole.”135  The con-
  
 132. DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, su-
pra note 113, at 164-65. 
 133. The Latin expression erga omnes means “towards all.”  In the Barce-
lona Traction case, the International Court of Justice used the term in its 
dicta to describe an obligation a State or States had to the International 
Community.  “In view of the importance of the rights involved, all states can 
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.”  The Court further expounded on the concept by contextualizing it in 
a human rights framework.  “Such obligations derive, for example, in contem-
porary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of 
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimina-
tion.” Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Limited: Sec-
ond Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3, p. 33-34; see also  MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT 
OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 1-2 (1997). 
 134. Jus cogens has been described as “rules to protect some common con-
cerns of the subjects of law.  A contractual arrangement, despite its being 
inter parties, may nevertheless affect such general values and interests as are 
considered indispensable by a society at a given time.”  LAURIE HANNIKAINEN, 
PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 1 (1988).   
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulated in Art. 53 that  
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a per-
emptory norm of general international law.  For the purposes of the 
present Convention a peremptory norm of general international law 
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general in-
ternational law having the same character.   
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added). 
  According to Ragazzi, “The origins of the concept of jus cogens are usu-
ally traced back to some writings of the earlier part of this century, but the 
concept has not been utilized with any degree of consistency in the practice of 
States and by international tribunals in the period before the adoption of the 
Vienna Convention.”  RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, 
supra note 133, at 44-45. 
 135. NINA H.B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMES 97 (2000), supra note 13. 
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cept, despite its inherent logic, has only in the past half-century 
worked its way into the international legal vernacular.136  Jus 
cogens norms function “to protect the society and its institutions 
from harmful consequences of individual agreements.”137  Lend-
ing to the confusion is the fact that beyond acts of slavery, 
which have long since engendered the protection of jus cogens, 
“relatively few examples of jus cogens enjoy unanimous support; 
for many proposed peremptory rules, there are bound to be en-
thusiastic and lukewarm supporters, as well as open and hid-
den opponents.”138  Therefore, some legal scholars, like Maurizio 
Ragazzi, conclude that the relationship between obligations 
erga omnes and jus cogens in the context of human rights is still 
developing and “uncertain.”139  Yet, other international scholars 
hold to an emerging and flourishing consensus that both con-
cepts have distinct viability and applicability to international 
human rights law.140   
Perhaps nowhere are jus cogens and obligations erga omnes 
more compatible than when applied to human rights and inter-
national crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.141  Professor 
  
 136. RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at 
12.  Ragazzi points to documents arising in the wake of the Barcelona Trac-
tion case of the 1970s: “After the Barcelona Traction case, references to the 
concept of obligations erga omnes have occurred both in judgments and advi-
sory opinions rendered by the International Court and pleadings of the par-
ties” (citing in particular to the cases on Nicaragua, East Timor and Bosnia-
Herzegovina). 
  Because “the precise implications in practice of the concept of obliga-
tions erga omnes have not yet been established, and the idea of an action 
popularis in international law is not well accepted,” obligations erga omnes 
are difficult to define and harder still to identify.  JØRGENSEN, RESPONSIBILITY 
OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 13, at 94. 
 137. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 134, at 1.   
 138. RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at 
57. 
 139. Id. at 48-49. 
 140. Orlin & Scheinin, Introduction to THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW, supra note 95 at 1. 
 141. Ragazzi concludes that the similarities between jus cogens and obliga-
tions erga omnes stem from three factors.  First, “like obligations erga omnes, 
norms of jus cogens are meant to protect the common interests of States and 
basic moral values.”  Secondly, “classic examples of norms of jus cogens which 
emerged during the codification of the law of treaties largely coincide with the 
examples of obligations erga omnes given in the Barcelona Traction case.”  
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Kenneth Randall noted, “Universal crimes, obligations erga 
omnes and peremptory norms may be viewed as doctrinal sib-
lings, sharing the common lineage of a modern world legal order 
based on global peace and human dignity.”142  At the Florence 
Conference on State Responsibility, a model was advanced to 
show the intricate relationship between jus cogens, obligations 
erga omnes and international crimes, where a large circle repre-
sented obligations erga omnes, within it a smaller circle repre-
senting jus cogens, and within that a smaller circle, represent-
ing international crimes.143 
By analyzing why legal theorists link the three concepts to-
gether, one can arrive at a another model for their inter-
relatedness: “The intention behind the erga omnes theory… is to 
sound the death knell of narrow bilateralism and sanctified ego-
ism for the sake of the universal protection of fundamental 
norms relating, in particular, to human rights.”144  Similar to the 
jus cogens doctrine and its relation to the theory of interna-
tional crimes, “[obligations erga omnes] is inspired by highly 
respectable ethical considerations.”145  When discussing interna-
  
And finally, Ragazzi concludes that “characteristic expressions attaching to 
the concept of jus cogens (such as the international community ‘as a whole’) 
occur also in the International court’s dictum on obligations erga omnes.”  
RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at 72.  
Despite the similarities, Ragazzi still concludes, however, “[T]he concept of 
obligations erga omnes is independent from that of jus cogens.”  JØRGENSEN, 
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 13, at 96, 
n.19. 
 142. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 
66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 841 (1988), supra note 52.  Randall observed, however, 
that “pragmatic, political, and other legal considerations sometimes pose ob-
stacles, whether warranted or not, to the domestic implementation of each of 
those principles and doctrines.”  Id. at 841. 
 143. JØRGENSEN, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 
supra note 13, at 97 (citing G. Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International 
Crimes, and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three Related Concepts, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT 
ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 151, 160 (J.H.H. Weiler, M. Spinedi & A. 
Cassese eds.) (1989).  Jørgensen points out that the ILC adopted this view 
that jus cogens “is a narrower category than obligations erga omnes.”  Id. at 
97, n. 22. 
 144. JØRGENSEN, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 
supra note 13, at 96, citing P. Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in Interna-
tional Law 1983 AJIL 77, 432 (1983). 
 145. Id. at 96. 
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tional crimes, Ragazzi warns legal jurists to take caution, no 
matter what paradigm is utilized, not to lose sight of the exist-
ing “rights and remedies” under established international law.146 
The Restatement on Foreign Relations expressly addresses 
violations of customary human rights law in the context of jus 
cogens and obligations erga omnes, reinforcing the direct rela-
tionship between the two doctrines and international crimes.147  
The writers of the Restatement explicitly assert that not all 
human rights are peremptory norms or jus cogens, but that 
genocide, slavery or slave trade, and torture, among a lengthier 
list of international crimes, emphatically are.148  Any interna-
tional agreement “that violates them is void.”149  A clear duty 
exists for states to abide by the principles of jus cogens in re-
gard to those listed international crimes.  The Restatement un-
equivocally states that the responsibility is “to all states” – 
hence to the international community.150  “Violations of the rules 
stated… are violations of obligations to all other states.”151  Ad-
ditionally, the writers of the Restatement hold that if the obli-
gations to the international community are violated “any state 
may invoke the ordinary remedies available to a state when its 
rights under customary law are violated.”152 
  
 146. Ragazzi includes a very detailed breakdown of international crimes, as 
provided by the International Law Commission, which includes “(a) a serious 
breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security… (c) a serious breach on a wide-
spread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safe-
guarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide, 
apartheid…”  RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 
133, at 15.  
 147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 cmt. n - o (1987). 
 148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987). 
 149. Id. 
 150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 cmt. o (1987). 
 151. Those obligations are obligations erga omnes.  Id. 
 152. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Genocide,153 an indisputable international crime with univer-
sal jurisdiction, is a prime example of an international crime to 
which the States owe the international community obligations 
erga omnes not to commit or tolerate and to which the jus co-
gens norm applies.154  The writers of the Restatement list geno-
cide first on their list of crimes that violate customary laws of 
human rights.155  William Schabas asserts that the sources of 
international law support the coexistence of the three concepts 
– international crimes, jus cogens and obligations erga omnes – 
as a rule of customary international law.156   
In the case against Serbia, Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht 
wrote that “the duty to “prevent” genocide is a duty that rests 
upon all parties and is a duty owed by each party to every 
other.”157  In the judgment on the preliminary objections raised 
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that International Court 
  
 153. Under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide, Art. 1 stated that “genocide, whether committed in time of peace or 
time of war, is a crime under international law.” Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N. GAOR Res. 260 (III) A, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Dec. 9, 1948).  “This treaty is now considered a rule of mod-
ern customary international law, bind[ing] on all states (whether they have 
ratified the Convention or not) and requiring them to prosecute acts of geno-
cide.”  GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 228 (2000). 
 154. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 444-45 (2000).   
 155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 (1987). 
 156. Turning to the sources of international law, Schabas discusses four 
International Court of Justice cases arising as a result of breaches of the 
Genocide Convention, namely Pakistan against India (1972), Bosnia and Her-
zegovina against Yugoslavia (1993) and the Yugoslavia counter-claim (1997), 
and the Yugoslavia claim against members of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO) (1999).  Schabas also references the Barcelona Traction 
case and its “oft-cited remark about the erga omnes nature of the prohibition 
of genocide.”  He refers to the Nuclear Weapons case, in which some states 
argued, “The prohibition of genocide (as set out in the Genocide Convention) 
was a relevant rule of customary law applicable to the question of nuclear 
weapons.”  The court did take into consideration that line of argument in de-
ciding the Nuclear Weapons case.  It greatly qualified, however, the applica-
tion of prohibition against genocide to the matter at hand.  SCHABAS, 
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 474-75. 
 157. Id. at 493. 
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addressed obligations erga omnes,158 writing, “[T]he rights and 
obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention are rights 
and obligations erga omnes.  The Court noted that the obliga-
tions each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of 
genocide are not territorially limited by the Convention.”159  Ra-
gazzi proposes that the right vested in the International Com-
munity, to which the corresponding duty lies with the States, is 
not limited to the act of genocide, but rather suggests that “the 
character erga omnes would not be restricted to the prohibition 
of genocide, but would attach in general to the ‘rights and obli-
gations enshrined by the Convention’, an expression that would 
seem to include the obligations to prevent and punish acts of 
genocide.”160 
The Restatement reinforces the doctrine that all states have a 
duty to adjudicate, convict and punish those who perpetuate the 
crime of genocide.161  Parties bound by the Genocide Convention 
“are bound also by the provisions requiring states to punish 
persons guilty of conspiracy, direct and public incitement, or 
attempt to commit genocide…and to extradite persons accused 
of genocide.”162  If a state failed to act in accordance with its re-
  
 158. Both the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia had raised the issue.  RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA 
OMNES, supra note 133, at 96. 
 159. Id. (citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996, 
p. 23, para. 31). 
 160. Id. 
Bartram S. Brown suggests that states may be more comfortable with the 
obligation to punish crimes such as genocide than with an obligation to pre-
vent them.  Whether or not that is the case, the analysis would imply that the 
duty does exist, despite the states’ willingness to accept that obligation. 
Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 108, at 
395-96. 
 161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 cmt. d (1987). 
 162. Id. Even parties not party to the Genocide Convention are under those 
obligations.  Its provisions have become rules of customary international law.  
Id.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 Rep. n.3 (1987)(Genocide was declared an international crime as 
early as the Nuremberg Charter, but was classified at that time as a “crime 
against humanity”).  See also Mark A. Summers, The International Court of 
Justice’s Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How Has it Affected the Development of 
a Principle of Universal Jurisdiction that would Obligate All States to Prose-
cute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 63, 81-82 (2003) (“Soon after the 1949 
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sponsibilities to adjudicate, punish, or extradite perpetrators of 
genocide, that state would seriously “breach on a widespread 
scale” an “international obligation of essential importance for 
safeguarding the human being…”163 
An ongoing debate regarding the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention is often coupled with any discussion of a state’s duty 
to adjudicate and punish genocide.164  A healthy dispute contin-
ues to rage regarding its permissibility, absent any discussion 
of privileges or obligations.165  The debate dates well before the 
  
Geneva and Genocide Conventions were adopted, their prohibitions against 
war crimes and genocide were regarded as customary international law.”). 
 163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 702 Rep. n.3 (1987). 
 164. As early as Germany’s aggressions of 1933, states of the world consid-
ered whether they had a right (or in a Hofeldian context a privilege) to inter-
vene when human rights were violated.  SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 491.  The Geneva Convention did not 
specify that a state had the privilege or the duty to intervene in episodes of 
genocide.  Id.   
  More recently, during the humanitarian intervention undertaken in 
Kosovo, President William Clinton stated, “We should not countenance geno-
cide or ethnic cleansing anywhere in the world if we have the power to stop 
it.”  Bob Davis, Pledging a ‘Clinton Doctrine’ for Foreign Policy Creates Con-
cerns for Adversaries and Allies Alike, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 6, 1999, at A12.  This 
statement presupposed a right to try and punish when stating that genocide 
should not be “countenanced” and proposed an independent state’s privilege to 
intervene in its cessation or prevention. 
 165. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 134, at 80-81.   
  In the case of Yugoslavia, Judge Lauterpacht concluded that customary 
international law – looking primarily at the practice of the states – might 
regrettably hold that “inactivity” on the parts of states to genocidal conduct is 
“permissible.”  This would reinforce the concept that under the rules of cus-
tomary international law, there is no duty, if indeed even a privilege, for an 
independent state to take actions with the purpose of preventing or ending 
genocide.  SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 495. 
Some scholars considered the humanitarian intervention undertaken in Kos-
ovo “illegal but legitimate.”  Timothy Garton, Imagine No America, THE 
GUARDIAN, Sept. 19, 2002, at 21. 
  And yet other scholars hold that humanitarian intervention is a rule of 
customary international law.  International Law Professor Jack Goldsmith 
concluded, “If you read the letter of international law, it does not expressly 
provide an exception for a humanitarian intervention.  But many people think 
such an exception does exist as a matter of custom and practice.”  William 
Glaberson, Conflict in the Balkans: The Law: Legal Scholars Support Case for 
Using Force, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1999, at A8. 
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establishment of the United Nations and has been a part of in-
ternational rhetoric since the nineteenth century.166  Due to fear 
of over-use and misapplication,167 the international community 
including the United Nations has shied away from writing a 
direct rule for its application.168  Failing to do so has enabled its 
continued abuse and done nothing to mitigate its dangers.169 
Despite initial breakdown in the dialogue over whether hu-
manitarian intervention is a legitimate means, many scholars 
make compelling arguments that along with the duty to try, 
convict, and punish perpetrators of genocide, there is also a 
right – or a Hohfeldian privilege – to prevent genocide through 
the use of humanitarian intervention.170  Yet a fervent confi-
dence exists among select academics that humanitarian inter-
vention may soon, if it has not already, mature into a state’s 
duty where international crimes subject to obligations erga om-
  
 166. “By the end of the 19th century the majority of publicists admitted the 
right of humanitarian intervention… However, that doctrine was vague.”  
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 134, at 80. 
  Forcible humanitarian intervention may even have been more palat-
able prior to the establishment of the United Nations.  Armed force was le-
gitimized in the name of humanitarian intervention on a number of occasions, 
including the French invasion into Lebanon to assist Christians undergoing 
Syrian persecution in 1860, and again in 1877 when Russia invaded Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to assist in religious conflicts resulting in severe persecu-
tions of minority peoples.  Paul Lewis, The Right to Intervene for a Humani-
tarian Cause, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, § 4, at 22. 
 167. “Humanitarian intervention is even more malleable than most princi-
ples of international law, and is a treacherous ground on which to stand.” 
John R. Bolton, Clinton Meets ‘International Law’ in Kosovo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
5, 1999, at A23 (internal quotes omitted), supra note 26. 
 168. Gwynne Dyer, Same Old Song at the U.N., REC. (N.J.), Sept. 23, 2003, 
at Opinion.  U.N. members cannot “figure out how to write a rule on humani-
tarian intervention that could not be exploited by the great powers to justify 
neo-colonial interventions.”  Dyer concluded that in that case,  “it’s better not 
to write it at all.”  Id.  
 169. A real danger is the temptation to justify use of force by labeling it a 
humanitarian intervention when it is not so or fails to meet any of the estab-
lished requirements for one.  See, e.g., Ian Williams, The Humanitarian Temp-
tation, NATION, Dec. 9, 2002 (book review). 
 170. After the events in Somalia and Bosnia, it was no longer a question of 
“whether States individually or the international community as a whole could 
intervene… but rather that they must intervene.”  SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 492. 
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nes and the peremptory norms of jus cogens appear.171  Never-
theless, for many international legal academics, a state’s duty 
to launch a humanitarian intervention may still be a “maybe.”172 
The triumvirate of jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, and in-
ternational crimes attach to other crimes subject to universal 
jurisdiction similar in makeup to genocide, prompting the states 
to fulfill their duty to the international community and to 
prosecute.173  For crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
which “by virtue of their level of atrocity, attract universal ju-
risdiction,” the obligation to punish, rooted in obligations erga 
omnes, must exist.174  Almost two-thirds of all states have, either 
through legislation, treaties, or constitutions, granted their 
courts authority to “exercise universal jurisdiction over some 
conduct amounting to war crimes…”175 Approximately ninety-
  
 171. During the United States deliberations on whether or not to involve 
itself in the conflict raging in Rwanda, State Department spokeswoman 
Christine Shelley said that the “United States was not prepared to declare 
that genocide was taking place in Rwanda because ‘there are obligations 
which arise in connection with the use of the term.’”  Id. at 495 (citing PHILIP 
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED 
WITH OUR FAMILIES, STORIES FROM RWANDA 153 (1998)). 
 172. According to Michael Walzer, a political philosopher at the Institute for 
Advanced Study at Princeton University, the doctrine of humanitarian inter-
vention may suggest a state “ha[s] a right, and maybe an obligation, to go in 
and stop it if you can.”  Peter Steinfels, Reshaping Pacifism to Fight Anguish 
in Reshaped World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1992, at A1. 
 173. “Customary international law also recognizes any crime that is univer-
sally condemned by the international community as a jus cogens international 
crime, which gives rise to obligations erga omnes.  In accordance with custom-
ary international law, an obligation erga omnes requires a state party to ex-
tradite or prosecute perpetrators of these crimes found within its territory.”  
Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 The 
United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Exe-
cution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 
911, 913-14 (2002). 
  Ragazzi writes, “[W]hile it is true that the concept of obligations erga 
omnes can and does contribute to the protection and promotion of human 
rights, it is equally true that human rights are instrumental to the consolida-
tion of such concepts as obligations erga omnes.”  RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at 135. 
 174. ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 153, at 248; see also 
Brown, Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 108, at 395. 
 175. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION – THE DUTY OF 
STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION, ch. 1, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).  Amnesty estimates that 
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five states have implemented some form of legislation granting 
their courts universal jurisdiction over “persons suspected of at 
least some crimes against humanity.”176  Torture is one crime 
against humanity often addressed in legislative grants of juris-
diction to domestic courts.177  However, even if a state does not 
incorporate grants of jurisdiction into its legislataive or consti-
tutional bodies, customary international law still grants juris-
diction.178  In the Congo v. Belgium case brought before the In-
ternational Court of Justice, Judges Kooijmanns and Buergen-
thal concluded, “[E]xercising extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
obligatory when the conditions of the post-war conventions are 
met.”179 
In addition to genocide, war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity, jus cogens and obligations erga omnes are firmly recog-
nized as having dominion over the international crime of ag-
gression.180  Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
addresses Acts of Aggression, stating that the Security Council 
  
at least 120 states have enacted legislation “which would appear to permit 
their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct amounting to some 
or all war crimes in certain circumstances.”  Id.  The extensive list of states 
include Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, 
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic – to name only a few.  Id.  Although 
the majority of the states have never availed themselves of the existing liber-
ties afforded their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction, the international 
and domestic legal instruments of the states would permit such a show of 
authority. 
 176. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 175, at 
ch. 6.  States listed in the Amnesty report include, but are not limited to, Al-
geria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Can-
ada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States, and Venezuela.  Id.  
 177. Id. 
 178. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 175, at 
Introduction. 
 179. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in Congo v. 
Belgium, supra note 162, at 95 (citing Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. at PP 59-
60 (Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins)). 
 180. The international crime of aggression can be defined as “an armed 
attack by one State against another… bolstered by the requirement that there 
must be a serious breach of an international obligation essential for the main-
tenance of international peace and security.”  DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA 
OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 113, at 309. 
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“shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”181  In the Barcelona Traction case, the first 
example cited by the court of an obligation erga omnes is the 
“outlawing of acts of aggression.”182 
Where a state is unable or unwilling to judge and punish per-
petrators of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity, 
the duty to adjudicate does not disappear.183  Under the contin-
ued use of Hohfeldian paradigm, the international community 
has not relinquished its right to retribution; hence the duty re-
mains.184  If a right exists, the correlative duty cannot “impede” 
that right.185  In addition, the holder of the right can demand the 
“performance of other subjects’ obligations.”186  Because a breach 
  
 181. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
 182. RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at 
74; see also DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, 
supra note 113, at 56, citing the ILC-draft, Commentary Article 19, Part One, 
95-96 on State responsibility (Paragraph 3(a) states that “a serious breach of 
international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, such as that prohibiting aggression” may result 
in an international crime). 
 183. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, supra note 12, at 31-32. 
 184. Id.  Although historically some countries have conducted “fact-finding 
followed by forgiveness” as a means of exercising reconciliation for human 
rights violations, this method of resolution is unacceptable under the concept 
of obligations erga omnes.  The practice of “Truth and Reconciliation” is incon-
sistent “with the view that crimes against humanity attract an erga omnes 
obligation to prosecute and punish.”  States such as Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, 
El Salvador, Haiti and Argentina, to name a few, violated their duty to the 
international community by failing to prosecute and punish and instead im-
posing a Truth and Reconciliation process upon individuals and regimes that 
carried out gross violations of human rights.  See generally, ROBERTSON, 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 153, at 266-78.  See also, Mark S. Ellis, 
The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and 
National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 229 (2002). 
 185. DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, su-
pra note 113, at 67 (“If a right has been validly conferred by a permissive rule, 
a correlative obligation must be seen to exist not to impede the exercise of 
such a right”). 
 186. Id. “The necessity of correlative rights is postulated on the basis that 
there must always be, at least theoretically and to begin with, another subject 
of international law entitled to demand the performance of an obligation.”  Id.  
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of those obligations “generally affect[s] particular or all 
States,”187 when a state breaches, the obligation or duty must be 
adopted by another state or international forum in order for the 
international community to see its rights safeguarded and pre-
served.188   
Increasing support for the view that states cannot harbor 
perpetrators of international crimes has strengthened.189  “Un-
der the aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) rule, 
[states] are required to exercise jurisdiction over such persons 
no matter where the crime occurred or to extradite them to a 
state able and willing to do so.”190  If no such state exists then 
the state should surrender them to an international criminal 
court “with jurisdiction over the suspect and the crime.”191 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: WHEN STATES 
CANNOT OR WILL NOT FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATION IT SHOULD 
BE DISCHARGED TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 
The ICC was established to function complementarily to na-
tional criminal jurisdiction.192  The ICC was never intended to 
replace domestic courts prosecuting war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity; rather, the concept of complementar-
ity193 was embraced as a safeguard against fears that the court 
  
De Hoogh notes another compelling necessity that drives the right/obligation 
paradigm is the urgency for “an imperative… kind of measure against repeti-
tion.”  Prosecution, conviction and punishment for those responsible for the 
commission of an international crime can secure that assurance.  Id. at 165. 
 187. This suggests that the “international community” at large would suffer 
the effects of the breach. 
 188. DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, su-
pra note 113, at 68.   
 189. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 175, at 
Introduction. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. The Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
emphasizes that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdic-
tion over those responsible for international crimes,” but that where a state 
cannot fulfill its obligation the court exists to compliment national criminal 
jurisdiction.  Rome Statute, supra note 9, at Preamble & Art. 1. 
 193. Complementarity means that “instead of replacing national jurisdic-
tions, the Court will intervene only in those situations where national justice 
systems are unavailable or ineffective.  Unlike the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals, the ICC does not have ‘primacy’ over national jurisdictions.”  
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could potentially usurp the role of functional domestic courts in 
their capacity to adjudicate such crimes.194  If a state is able to 
perform its obligation to try perpetrators of these three interna-
tional crimes, the ICC cannot intervene; where a state is unable 
or unwilling to act, however, that state’s obligation will be dis-
charged to the ICC for full and proper adjudication.195  
In 1994, the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the 
ICC strongly favored a court “complementary in nature.”196  
Prompted by a fear that the ICC would challenge state sover-
eignty and erode existing domestic judicial schemes, comple-
mentary jurisdiction seemed the ideal way for the court to as-
sure that the international goal of punishing and eradicating 
international crimes like genocide did not undermine functional 
state courts that could adjudicate with agility and conscien-
tiousness.197  Subsequently, the ICC was established in 1998 
under the principle of “complementarity,” which relegated the 
ICC to a deferential role, second in line to adjudicate a crime 
only after the state failed to administer justice.198   
  
Mauro Politi, The Rome Statute of the ICC: Rays of Light and Some Shadows, 
in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE 
TO IMPUNITY 14 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001). 
 194. “The concept of complementarity can be viewed as a procedural and 
substantive safeguard against a supranational institution curtailing the sov-
ereign rights of nations.  It ensures that the judgments of a domestic court are 
not replaced by the judgments of an international court.”  Ellis, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court, supra note 2, at 219. 
 195. “[U]nder the concept of complementarity, the ICC will only have juris-
diction if there is a breakdown in the national system of justice or a state sim-
ply fails to act.”  Id. at 221-22.   
 196. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 49 (1994), supra note 68. 
 197. There was a recommendation by the Task Force that care be taken “to 
assure that ongoing efforts at mutual legal assistance are not undermined.  
Structures must be created that supplement and reinforce existing schemes.  
The rule of law must be strengthened and not eroded as a result of the crea-
tion of an international criminal court.”  Id. at 49. 
 198. Sarah B. Sewall et al., The United States and the International Crimi-
nal Court: An Overview, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Sarah B. 
Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000). 
  The United States had great fear, however, that the ICC would over-
ride state sovereignty by abandoning complementarity.  “Therefore, the 
United States may remain apprehensive until the ICC demonstrates its rea-
soning and intent over time.”  Id. at 20.  That apprehension was manifested in 
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Extradition has generated much academic and political con-
cern over the past century.199  The difficulties arising under a 
state’s “extradite or prosecute” dilemma fueled much of the 
early ICC debates.200  Where the state is unwilling to extradite 
or prosecute, the Rome Statute established that the ICC can 
step in and exert its jurisdiction.201  Unwillingness may be mani-
fested through sham trials or a state “going through the mo-
tions” of investigating and instigating a criminal prosecution 
where none is forthcoming.202  Of course it may consist of no trial 
at all.  One scholar suggested that in order for a govern-
ment/judicial system to be labeled unwilling there must be a 
  
the United States decision to refrain from participating in the court under the 
Bush Administration.  That refusal on the part of the United States to support 
the ICC has been predicted as a great undermining of the court and increas-
ing its likelihood of potential failure.  Scholar Leila Nadya Sadat wrote in 
2000, “Sadly, one of the major obstacles to the Court’s successful establish-
ment is the refusal of the United States to participate in the creation of this 
new international institution.  There is not doubt that the failure of the 
United States to join and to support the League of Nations contributed to the 
ultimate demise of that institution, and one wonders whether the ICC is simi-
larly doomed before it is even established.”  Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution 
of the ICC: From the Hague to Rome and Back Again, in THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000). 
 199. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
supra note 68, at 47. 
  One of the greatest frustrations in the United States’ war on drugs has 
long been the inability to extradite targeted drug kingpins to the United 
States to stand trial.  Addressing the House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Rights, Chairman John Mica 
stated that the key to successful international law enforcement was extradi-
tion, particularly with regards to South America.  The lack of an extradition 
treaty with Mexico was considered an impediment to the United States’ abil-
ity to effectively counter drug trafficking and other related international 
crimes.  International Law: The Importance of Extradition: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 106th 
Cong. 1-3 (1999) (statement of Rep. John L. Mica, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources). 
 200. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
supra note 68, at 47. 
 201. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 17(3). 
 202. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURt 66 (2001). 
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“systematic pattern of judicial inaction in pertinent cases,” not a 
failure to successfully prosecute one or two individual cases.203 
Conversely, a state may be willing to prosecute human rights 
abuses, but unable to do so.  Under the Rome Statute, a state is 
unable to prosecute when “due to a total or substantial collapse 
or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is un-
able to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testi-
mony or otherwise unable to carry out is proceedings.”204  
Scholar Mark Ellis proposed four likely categories for states 
unable to carry out proceedings: (1) states entangled in conflict 
(domestic or international); (2) states experiencing political un-
rest or economic crisis; (3) states in transition; and (4) states 
entirely lacking a judicial system satisfying the international 
standard.205  Similarly, Mauro Politi offered that certain situa-
tions would trigger the court’s awareness of a state unable to 
adjudicate, such as the “total or partial collapse of a national 
judicial system” or the “presence of [a] sham proceeding [ ] un-
dertaken to shield the accused from criminal responsibility.”206 
A wealth of examples arises out of the South American states.  
Chile and Argentina, countries which saw gross human rights 
violations during the mid-twentieth century under brutal dicta-
torships, were in many senses unable to properly try perpetra-
tors, despite a willingness to do so, due to the grants of amnesty 
or pardons written into law to shield the defendants.207  This 
situation fits into Ellis’ second and third paradigms.208  States 
experiencing political unrest may, according to Ellis, threaten 
the “independence of the judiciary and its proper functioning.”209  
A good example of this type of judicial breakdown can be seen in 
the political pressure and military threats directed at judges in 
Uruguay, resulting in unsuccessful initiatives against human 
rights violations until the 2000 election of a president commit-
  
 203. Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International 
Criminal Court: A Paradox of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” 9 ANN. SURV. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 41 (2003). 
 204. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 17(3). 
 205. Ellis, The International Criminal Court, supra note 2, at 238. 
 206. Politi, The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 193, at 15. 
 207. Roseann M. Latore, Coming Out of the Dark: Achieving Justice for Vic-
tims of Human Rights Violations by South American Military Regimes, 25 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 432-33 (2002). 
 208. Ellis, The International Criminal Court, supra note 2, at 238. 
 209. Id. at 239. 
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ted to investigating disappearances and kidnapped children.210  
The creation of the ICC was seen by scholars and proponents of 
accountability in these fragile democracies of South America as 
a maturation of international law, evidenced by the establish-
ment of this forum for adjudication, the sole function of which 
was to fulfill the states’ duties to adjudicate where the govern-
ments were unable to do so.211 
Because states have a duty to prosecute international crimes 
under obligations erga omnes, the ICC assures that the duty, 
the right correlative to which is vested in the international 
community, is fulfilled.212  If the state is unable to promote and 
protect human rights through prosecuting those who violate 
them, the duty vested in the state can be fulfilled by the ICC.213  
Even states not party to the Rome Statute have an obligation 
not to frustrate its purpose.214  To do so contravenes the dis-
charge of a state’s obligation to a forum that is capable of satis-
fying the state’s duty when the state is unable to do so.  This 
violates the norms of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes, 
  
 210. See Latore, Coming Out of the Dark, supra note 207, at 433. 
 211. Id. at 446. 
 212. “The Statute of the International Criminal Court will have an impor-
tant impact on the existing regime of international guarantees for the protec-
tion of human rights.”  Fausto Pocar, The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and Human Rights, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 70 (Mauro Politi 
& Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001). 
 213.  
The current system of international guarantees is essentially based, 
both at the universal and at the regional level, on procedures aimed 
at establishing whether States observe their obligations to promote 
and protect human rights, as set forth in customary rules or treaty 
provisions.  When violations occur, the purpose of such procedures is 
to make a finding in this respect and to set a pressure on the State in 
order that it conforms to its obligations.  
Id. 
 214. Giuseppe Nesi, The Obligation to Cooperate with the International 
Criminal Court and States Not Party to the Statute, in THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 223 (Mauro 
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).   Giuseppe Nesi concludes that “an obliga-
tion to cooperate even for States not Parties that do not sign any cooperation 
agreement with the Court could be deduced from instruments different from 
the Statute.”  He is referring to instruments establishing universal jurisdic-
tion and jus cogens over the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, such as 
the Geneva Convention on Genocide.  Id. at 222. 
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which mandate that the state punish those who commit crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.215  The 
establishment of the ICC assures that the obligation of the 
States to the international community will be carried out, 
strengthening the system of accountability.216 
This argument for discharging a state’s duty to the ICC finds 
greatest strength in universal jurisdiction, despite the ICC’s 
purported basis on state consent.217  Early in the ICC’s incep-
tion, modern scholars, international practitioners and forward-
thinking states pushed for jurisdiction based on universal juris-
diction, rather than on the consent of states.218  In order for the 
ICC to effectively complement domestic courts such jurisdiction 
was seen as essential and feasible since the ICC only had juris-
diction over crimes already recognized as subject to universal 
jurisdiction.219  Under that proposition, a state’s consent to the 
ICC was irrelevant; if a state could not or would not fulfill its 
duty to prosecute, then automatically the duty would flow to the 
ICC, which would exert its authority through universal jurisdic-
  
 215. Id. 
 216. Pocar, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and Hu-
man Rights, supra note 212, at 72. 
 217. See KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION 33 (2000); Rome Statute, su-
pra note 9, at art. 12. See also Geoffrey Bindman, Illegal U.S. Campaign 
Against International Justice: Washington and the International Court, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., July 16, 2003, at 8. 
 218. Germany proposed that state consent should be irrelevant.  Sounding 
very much like proponents of universal jurisdiction, the German proposal for 
the ICC’s basis of jurisdiction stated,  
Under current international law, all States may exercise universal 
criminal jurisdiction concerning acts of genocide[,] crimes against 
humanity[,] and war crimes, regardless of the nationality of the of-
fender, the nationality of the victims and the place where the crime 
was committed… Given this background there is no reason why the 
ICC – established on the basis of a Treaty concluded by the largest 
number of States – should not be in the very same position to exercise 
universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in the same manner as the Contracting Parties themselves.  
U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/DP.2, cited in MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 203, at 35.  
 219. MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 217, at 
33; see also JENNIFER ELSEA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OVERVIEW AND 
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 18-25 (2003); SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 202, at 60. 
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tion.220  Despite the ICC’s ultimate establishment as consent 
based, the fundamental existence of obligations erga omnes and 
the principles of universal jurisdiction override that consent-
based jurisdiction and compel all states to refrain from interfer-
ing with the satisfaction of the international community’s right 
to try perpetrators of human rights violations.221 
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ BILATERAL IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS 
CONFLICT WITH A STATE’S DUTY TO EXTRADITE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
In 1994, when the jurisdiction of the ICC, its interplay with 
the states, and the basis for its authority were all the subject of 
hot debate, the American Bar Association’s Task Force moni-
tored the progress towards the establishment of the ICC.222  Dis-
cussions regarding the basis of the ICC’s jurisdiction clearly 
incorporated a recognition and assertion that jus cogens would 
be the earmark of the court’s foundation, the cement that bound 
the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes violating “fundamental 
norms.”223  Less than ten years later, phrases like jus cogens and 
fundamental international norms were no longer included in 
the United States’ vocabulary when analyzing or weighing the 
ICC’s authority.224  Distracted by unfounded fears that the ICC 
  
 220. See MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 217, 
at 33. 
 221. Id. at 33-35. 
 222. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
supra note 68, at 1. 
 223. Bowing to development in international law, the Task Force conceded: 
[T]here cannot any longer be a principled objection by Americans to 
the use of ‘fundamental norms.’  The United States for many years 
took the position that there was no such thing as jus cogens and that 
therefore it could not be bound by a customary norm to which it had 
not manifested its assent during the formative period of the norm.  
However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Article 
53, has now put that matter to rest. 
Id. at 11. 
 224. In 1998, the United States, after years of input on the language, juris-
diction, authority and structure of the court, voted against the ICC along with 
China, Iran, Iraq, Israel and Libya.  However, before leaving office, President 
William Clinton authorized the United States signing of the Rome Statute on 
December 31, 2000.  The statute was not submitted to the Senate for ratifica-
tion, and less than two years later in May 2002, the Bush administration nul-
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would use its authority to prosecute a political agenda, the 
United States’ focus shifted further away from the underpin-
nings of the ICC and its inherent jurisdiction over certain in-
ternational crimes, and instead challenged the ICC’s authority 
over Americans and its purportedly limitless autonomy.225   
Pointing to General Pinochet’s extradition to Spain to stand 
trial for human rights violations executed under his dictator-
ship in Chile, United States politicians feared machinations by 
the ICC to attempt jurisdiction over American Service-members 
despite the United States’ withdrawal from participation in the 
ICC.226  The legitimacy of the ICC came under attack and the 
United States Congress passed the American Servicemembers’ 
Act, prohibiting cooperation with the ICC and restricting U.S. 
participation in peacekeeping missions where a risk of ICC 
prosecution existed.  It also began blocking military aid to coun-
tries unless they signed agreements shielding U.S. troops pre-
sent in their territory from extradition to the ICC.227   
Simultaneously, the United States launched its bilateral im-
munity campaign to assure that United States citizens would 
  
lified the U.S. signature to the Rome Statute.  Chibueze, United States Objec-
tion to the International Criminal Court, supra note 203, at 21-22. 
 225. The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen 
and Officials From the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 1-2 (2000) (statement of Sen. Jesse 
Helms, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations). 
  The U.S.’ fears were particularly unfounded since the complementary 
nature of the court assures that established and functional judicial systems 
such as the ones in the U.S. would be highly unlikely to ever undergo a chal-
lenge from the ICC.  Additionally, politically motivated trials would be hard to 
launch since the Security Council can stall any ICC prosecution it seems pre-
mature or unfounded.  Furthermore, a pre-trial chamber must determine that 
there is reasonable basis for action.  Chris Patten, Globalization and the Law, 
EUR. UNION PRESS RELEASES, Oct. 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60919637; 
Guy Dinmore, Washington Presses Ahead with War Crimes Deals – Interna-
tional Criminal Court, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at 10. 
 226. The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen 
and Officials From the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 4-6 (2000) (statement of Hon. Cas-
per W. Weinberger, Former Secretary of Defense).  On Pinochet’s extradition 
and its universal jurisdiction basis see Latore, Coming Out of the Dark, supra 
note 207, at 440-42. 
 227. Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§ 2001-2015, 116 Stat. 820, 899-909 (2002); 
Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 2002 ARMY LAW 1, 14 (2002). 
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never be under the jurisdiction of the ICC, no matter where 
they lived or were stationed, no matter what international 
crimes they committed.  In agreeing to the immunity agree-
ments, foreign governments promised not to honor subpoenas or 
warrants issued by the ICC against Americans.228  By November 
2003, seventy countries had signed immunity agreements.229  
The immunity agreements established that the two agreeing 
states would not extradite each other’s citizens to the ICC with-
out mutual consent.230  Justifying the bilateral immunity 
agreements by pointing to the Rome Statute’s Article 98, the 
United States stated that the ICC itself allowed for these im-
munities.231 
  
 228. Philip Shishkin & Jess Bravin, German Refusal Involving New War-
Crime Tribunal May Further Strain Ties, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2002, at A19. 
 229. Guy Dinmore, US Attacks European Union Over Immunity Agreements, 
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at 1. 
 230. Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court, 
supra note 203, at 50. 
  The United States’ Article 98 Proposal ironically reaffirms the comple-
mentary nature of the ICC and its inability to supplant functional national 
criminal jurisdiction.  However, it still assures that “absent the expressed 
consent” of the United States or the signatory state, citizens shall not be “sur-
rendered or transferred by any means to the International Criminal Court for 
any purpose or surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity 
or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender or 
transfer to the International Criminal Court.”  U.S. Government Article 98 
Proposal, available at www.hrw.org (last visited on Aug. 23, 2004). 
 231. Article 98 of the Rome Statute states:  
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance 
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the state or dip-
lomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the 
Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the 
waiver of the immunity.  The Court may not proceed with a request 
for surrender which would require the requested State to act incon-
sistently with its obligations under international agreements pursu-
ant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a 
person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain 
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the 
surrender.   
Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 98. 
  David Scheffer, the Clinton administration diplomat who negotiated 
Article 98, rebutted the Bush interpretation of Article 98, stating that the 
provision was “designed for U.S. military forces stationed overseas, as well as 
diplomats and Peace Corps workers.  ‘We didn’t care about mercenaries.’”  
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These Article 98 or bilateral immunity agreements contra-
vene a state’s established obligation under customary interna-
tional law to prosecute and punish perpetrators of international 
crimes and, where failing to do so, the ability of the ICC to ful-
fill the state’s obligation to the international community.232  
Governments233 and international law scholars234 around the 
world have deemed the agreements illegal for various reasons 
under international law.235  Under jus cogens, a treaty cannot 
violate certain international norms, and under obligations erga 
omnes there is an international norm that bequeaths a duty to 
states to apprehend, prosecute and punish those who perpetrate 
the international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.236  A bilateral immunity agreement that con-
  
Philip Shishkin & Jess Bravin, EU Offers Deal on U.S. Immunity From Tri-
bunal, WALL ST. J., Sep. 13, 2002, at A8. 
 232. Additionally, international legal scholars have argued that the bilat-
eral immunity agreements are illegal under the customary international law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, “which obligates a state party not to do any-
thing that will undermine its treaty obligations.  State parties to the ICC 
agreed in Article 88 to ‘ensure that there are procedures available under their 
national law for all forms of cooperation’ listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute.”  
Bilateral Immunity Agreements undermine a state’s ability to comply with 
the terms of the treaty and accordingly are illegal.  Chibueze, United States 
Objection to the International Criminal Court, supra note 203, at 51. 
 233. In September, 2002, France and Germany concluded that exempting 
the U.S. from the authority of the ICC “would undermine the tribunal.”  U.S. 
Exemption from Tribunal Is Opposed, WALL ST. J., Sep. 3, 2002, at A16. 
 234. Richard Dicker, an international law expert at Human Rights Watch, 
stated, “The United States is pressing countries to enter into illegal contracts 
with them.”  Elizabeth Neuffer, Delegates Discuss US Effort to Limit War 
Crimes Tribunal, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 6, 2002, at A 13. 
 235. Swiss Foreign Ministry legal adviser Nicolas Michel stated that his 
country favored “a strong and independent court,” and that the US’ attempts 
to excuse itself from the court’s jurisdiction would “weaken the court.”  Neuf-
fer, Delegates Discuss US Effort to Limit War Crimes Tribunal, supra note 
220, at A 13.  Heads of legal departments from countries belonging to the 
European Union met in September, 2002 to find possible ways of addressing 
the United States’ concerns regarding the court without weakening it, but 
concluded that much of the court’s existing vulnerabilities were the result of 
attempts to appease United States’ concerns.  EU Governments Seek Answer 
to US Demands Over International Court, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sep. 4, 2002, at 
*1. 
 236. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE 
UNLAWFUL ATTEMPT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE US CITIZENS 
PERMANENT IMPUNITY FROM INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2004). 
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travenes that established duty, under jus cogens, must be ille-
gal.237 
The greatest concern has consistently been the fear that 
United States’ actions would undermine the ICC, which indeed 
they have.238  By undermining the ICC and frustrating states’ 
attempts to cooperate with the ICC, the United States commits 
a small disservice compared to the infringement on the interna-
tional communities’ rights, thwarted by the encouragement of 
states’ shirking their obligations to “ensure that people respon-
sible for these crimes [i.e. genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity], as the most serious crimes under interna-
tional law, are brought to justice.”239 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the ICC has based its authority on consent and ter-
ritoriality,240 its most persuasive and sound basis rests on uni-
versal jurisdiction.241  The crimes over which the ICC has juris-
diction are crimes against humanity,242 war crimes243 and geno-
cide.244  All three have gained firm recognition as crimes over 
which there is universal jurisdiction, and are collectively ac-
cepted as crimes for which the state has at minimum a privi-
lege, under Hohfeld’s paradigm, to prosecute perpetrators.  
Stronger still is the fact that these three crimes have matured 
into crimes for which there is a duty, an obligation erga omnes, 
invested in the states, to prosecute and punish those who com-
mit these crimes.245 
  
 237. Id. 
 238. US Bilateral “Non-Surrender” Agreements Regarding the International 
Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2002, at *1. 
 239. NGOs Express Disappointment at Reports that Australia May Sign 
U.S. ICC Immunity Agreement: Historic ICC Supporter Has Stronger Role to 
Play, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 11, 2003, at *1. 
 240. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 12. 
 241. Kofi Annan, Message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO 
IMPUNITY xiii (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001), supra note 16. 
 242. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 7. 
 243. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 8. 
 244. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 6. 
 245. Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-
1976 The United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, 
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Under jus cogens as established by the Vienna Convention, 
an independent treaty is illegal if it conflicts “with a peremptory 
norm of general international law.”246  The United States, in its 
efforts to immunize its citizens from international criminal ac-
countability, has introduced into the international forum bilat-
eral immunity agreements that directly contravene the dis-
charge of unable or unwilling states’ duties to prosecute inter-
national crimes to the ICC.247  When that duty is contravened, 
the outstanding right, vested in the international community, a 
right bound and transfixed by obligations erga omnes, is left 
with an unfulfilled correlative duty for which it is owed comple-
tion. 
If indeed a time arises when the United States’ bilateral im-
munity agreements are used as a shield from the ICC, jus co-
gens, in its intricate relationship with obligations erga omnes 
and international crimes, demands that the bilateral immunity 
agreements be viewed as illegal – unenforceable and unable to 
contravene the proper role of the ICC in its complementary ca-
pacity.  The failure to do so would do more than simply under-
mine the ICC; it would shake the delicate and solidifying foun-
dation made up of the union between states’ obligations, the 
international community’s rights, and the international crimes 
that compel the relationship between the two.  The failure to 
employ jus cogens in enforcing the illegality of Article 98 immu-
nity agreements will surely weaken that fragile foundation, and 
what could have continued to mature into a concrete relation-
ship between rights, duties and the adjudication of interna-
tional crimes will crumble, too weak to assert its legitimate and  
  
and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 911, 913-14 (2002), supra note 173. 
 246. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), May 23, 1969, art. 
53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, supra note 20. 
 247. Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court, 
supra note 203, at 51. 
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legal authority based on the sound principles of universal juris-
diction. 
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